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ESSAY
Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis
for Expert Opinion Testimony: A
Response to Professor Carlson
Paul R. Rice*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits expert wit-
nesses to offer opinions based upon evidence that has not been
offered in the proceedings.1 The Rule also sanctions the expert's
basing her opinion on inadmissible evidence if that evidence is "of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."2 In a recent
Essay in this Review, Professor Carlson presents a helpful exposi-
tion of the confused evidentiary status of this otherwise inadmissi-
ble evidence.3 He correctly notes that the majority of courts refuse
to allow the inadmissible evidence upon which the expert bases her
* Professor, The Washington College of Law, The American University. B.B.A., Mar-
shall University; J.D., West Virginia University; LL.M., Yale University; author of Evi-
DENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1986). I wish to acknowledge the
editorial and research assistance of my Dean's Fellow, Donna Duvall, and to thank my col-
leagues Professors David Aaronson, James May, and James Boyle for their critique of my
ideas and helpful proposals.
1. Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 703.
2. Id.




opinion to come in as excess baggage with the opinion itself.4 The
expert's reliance upon the inadmissible evidence does not change
the evidentiary character of that evidence. For the limited purpose
of explaining the expert's opinion, however, courts do permit the
introduction of this otherwise inadmissible background
information.5
Thus, on the one hand, the jury may consider the facts or data
upon which the expert based her opinion to assess the weight to be
given to that opinion. Yet, on the other hand, the jury, when decid-
ing whether to arrive at the same conclusion, cannot accept what
the expert relied upon as true. In reaching its own conclusion, the
jury can rely only upon the product of that evidence-the expert's
opinion.' If this practice sounds like judicial double talk, it is. Pro-
fessor Carlson, however, supports this result on two grounds. First,
he contends that the introduction of the underlying facts would
violate the hearsay rule.' Second, Professor Carlson justifies exclu-
sion because of sixth amendment confrontation problems in crimi-
nal cases."
I disagree with Professor Carlson. With appropriate precau-
tions, the introduction of the inadmissible facts or data upon
which experts rely no more violates the hearsay rule's spirit than
do the volumes of evidence that regularly are introduced through
the numerous hearsay rule exceptions. And, although I am sympa-
thetic to his confrontation concerns, recent developments suggest
that no confrontation problem exists. More fundamentally, how-
ever, I oppose the view that Professor Carlson and the majority of
courts support because that view is both illogical and unwise.
4. Id. at n.25 and accompanying text. Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. In-
dus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (finding that although public records that
contained expert opinions and conclusions were admissible under the public records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, FED. R. Evw. 803(8)(c), the background information and data that
accompanied the public records had to be independently admissible under another excep-
tion to the hearsay rule before being offered for its truth).
5. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 74 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that a con-
versation between the expert witness and another doctor was the kind of information on
which experts in the field base their opinions and, therefore, the trial court should have
allowed inquiry into the conversation).
6. Cf. Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983), in
which the court, although acknowledging that the expert is allowed to disclose hearsay only
for the limited purpose of explaining his opinion's basis, allowed hearsay to be heard for its
truth because the opponent of the evidence failed to make a timely hearsay objection.




II. THE ILLOGIC OF IT ALL
Admitting an expert's opinion, but not its basis, is illogical
because one cannot accept an opinion as true without implicitly
accepting the facts upon which the expert based that opinion. The
value of any conclusion necessarily is tied to and dependent on its
premise." Consequently, if in forming an opinion someone assumes
that certain facts are true, the acceptance of that opinion necessa-
rily involves the acceptance of those assumed facts.10 Com-
pounding the absurdity of the approach supported by Professor
Carlson is the court's allowing the expert to recite the underlying
basis, and then instructing the jury not to accept the recited facts
as true (even though the expert did), but to consider those facts
only in assessing the value of the expert's opinion.11 This instruc-
tion is pure fiction; it cannot be done. Even if the instruction's dis-
tinction logically were possible, jurors likely would not be capable
of performing such mental gymnastics.
This practice is not a recent development. Courts have fol-
lowed it for decades when physicians testify regarding statements
made to them by their patients. 2 At one time, the hearsay excep-
tion for statements of present physical condition extended only to
patients' statements about conditions experienced contemporane-
ously with the utterances. Thus, the physician could repeat in the
courtroom, and the jury could accept as true, only what the patient
said to the doctor about the condition then being experienced. The
physician could not recount for truth the patient's statements
about his medical history and the cause of his injuries. She could,
9. Although a juror arbitrarily could attach value to an expert's opinion independent
of its basis because of the perceived credibility of that expert, this juror's behavior, in effect,
would be a relegation to the expert of the juror's factfinding role.
10. In the specific context of statements to a physician, which can be recited for the
purpose of explaining a doctor's opinion but not for substantive evidence, Professor McEl-
haney agrees with this conclusion. McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REV. 463, 467 (1977).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114, 1118 n.4 (10th Cir.) (instructing
the jury that the testimony was being admitted to show the basis of the expert's opinion and
not for the truth of the underlying source), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982); American
Universal Ins. Co. v. Falzone, 644 F.2d 65, 66 n.1 (1st Cir. 1981) (instructing the jury that
the expert's testimony about his colleague's investigation was being admitted only to show
basis of opinion, not for the truth of the investigation); United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147,
149-50 (9th Cir.) (recognizing the need for the court to instruct the jury that hearsay evi-
dence is to be considered solely as a basis for the expert's opinion and not for its own truth),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845 (1975).
12. See generally McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 292, at 839-40 (K. Brown 3d ed. 1984)




however, recite the patient's statements about medical history and
causation for the limited purpose of explaining her diagnosis and
treatment, if those statements had been critical to the diagnosis
and treatment.1i This practice, however, has gained no logic with
age. It was as schizophrenic and illogical when tied to the present
physical condition exception as it is now under Rule 703.1"
III. AN OPEN-ENDED HEARSAY EXCEPTION-A WISER OPTION
Aside from the illogic of the practice, I believe that the exclu-
sion of the underlying facts from the jury's consideration is unwise
for two reasons. First, the exclusion formally changes the expert's
role in litigation to that of a super-factfinder capable of producing
admissible substantive evidence (an opinion) from inadmissible
evidence.15 This capability allows the expert witness to influence
the outcome of a case based on evidence that the finder of fact
may not hear and cannot consider. Second, the exclusion of the
evidence ignores the objective assurance of reliability that the
expert's examination, evaluation, and reliance can provide-an as-
surance that historically has justified exceptions to the hearsay
rule. 16
A. The Historical Role of the Expert in Litigation
Historically, the expert's role in litigation has been solely to
assist the finder of fact.17 The expert's judgment is not a substitute
13. For example, the physician could testify that the patient said, "My stomach
hurts," and the jury could accept as true that the patient had a stomach ache. Yet the court
would refuse to admit the physician's testimony about the same patient's statements con-
cerning the medical history ("Several years ago I was diagnosed as having colitis") and the
cause of the condition for which treatment was sought ("I have been under a great deal of
stress during the past few months," or "I have been eating a lot of hot, spicy food lately").
The court, however, could admit the testimony to explain the physician's opinion.
14. Perhaps the practice was worse under the present physical condition exception
because the court would admit statements of history and cause only if they were crucial to
diagnosis and treatment. Unless the jury relegates its factfinding role to the expert, the jury
needs at least as much evidence as the doctor possessed to reach the same conclusion.
15. "Thus, when the expert witness has consulted numerous sources, and uses that
information, together with his own professional knowledge and experience, to arrive at his
opinion, that opinion is regarded as evidence in its own right and not as hearsay in dis-
guise." United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
954 (1972).
16. See generally 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1430 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (providing
the principle behind the exceptions to the hearsay rule).
17. For a general discussion of expert testimony, see Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND.
L. REV. 414 (1952).
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for that of the judge or jury."' For this reason, the common law
limited the admissibility of expert opinion testimony to those
instances when judges or jurors were unable to perform their fact-
finding role properly without the assistance of someone with spe-
cial expertise. This reason also explains the common-law approach
of receiving expert testimony only after its factual basis had been
revealed and independent evidence had been presented from which
the finder of fact reasonably could infer those facts.19 Without this
independent basis, the expert's opinion was irrelevant.20 If the
finder of fact was a jury, the expert testimony had to assist the
jury either in understanding the evidence it heard or in drawing
rational conclusions from that evidence. The expert was not an
independent source of substantive evidence unless she, like any
other witness, had personal knowledge of facts related to the cause
of action.21
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence formally sanctions
what the common law prohibited-reliance upon facts not of rec-
ord. If no means is adopted for explicitly making those facts part
of the record (because the expert relied upon them), this rule, with
no apparent reason or justification, will have changed significantly
the expert's role in litigation.
B. The Hearsay Issue
To maintain the historical role of the expert under Rule 703,
the underlying basis for the expert's opinion must qualify as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Justification for this hearsay excep-
tion appears in the standard established in Rule 703
itself-reasonable reliance by experts in the particular field. This
standard satisfies the traditional test for exceptions to the hearsay
rule: that the circumstances of the out-of-court utterance ade-
quately assure reliability in terms of both the accuracy of the
declarant's perception and memory and the sincerity with which
18. See id. at 428 (explaining purpose of expert testimony).
19. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, §§ 14, 15.
20. Id. § 15, at 38. The opinion logically may have been relevant in the sense that the
expert rationally based the opinion upon facts that were probative of the issues being liti-
gated. The opinion nonetheless was irrelevant to the expert's functioning vis-a-vis the fact-
finders, who had sole responsibility for resolving those issues based on evidence presented to
them through witnesses with personal knowledge.
21. As explained by Professor McElhaney, an expert witness is permitted to offer
opinions because he "is an explainer, whether he explains his own observations or someone
else's." McElhaney, supra note 10, at 471.
1987]
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the declarant recited what he perceived and remembered.22
The logic of sanctioning an expert's use of inadmissible evi-
dence in forming opinions is that if the evidence is of the type
experts reasonably rely upon in a particular field to form opinions,
the expert will possess sufficient expertise in evaluating the evi-
dence's reliability to justify its broader use in judicial proceedings.
As one court has stated: "Years of experience teach the expert to
separate the wheat from the chaff and to use only those sources
and kinds of information which are of a type reasonably relied
upon by similar experts in arriving at sound opinions on the sub-
ject. 1 2  If the witness possesses this ability (something that we
apparently must presume under Rules 702 and 703 upon establish-
ment of the witness' general expertise, along with the fact of regu-
lar reliance upon the facts or data in question) and, more impor-
tant, uses her expertise to evaluate the underlying information, the
standards of trustworthiness for the admission of hearsay will be
met. The argument for admissibility is buttressed because the ex-
pert who initially assessed the offered information's reliability is
presently available for cross-examination about that assessment.
This availability will allow the finder of fact to evaluate the relia-
bility of each piece of information and, in turn, the reliability of
opinions based upon it.
Unlike other established hearsay exceptions codified in Rules
803 and 804(b), under which the judge assesses a statement's relia-
bility based on the circumstances surrounding its utterance, the re-
liability justifying admission under the proposed Rule 703 excep-
tion would be based on a third party's out-of-court assessment.
Because the expert's screening creates a presumption that a suffi-
cient threshold of reliability exists, the direct assessment of those
surrounding circumstances in the judicial proceeding would shift
from the judge, as a question of admissibility, to the jury, as a
question of the weight to be given to the information and, ulti-
mately, to the opinion.
The critical premise underlying admission of the otherwise
inadmissible evidence is the expert's evaluation of the informa-
tion-not simply the expert's unquestioning reliance upon it for
the purpose of rendering an opinion for the litigation. Combining
her expertise with knowledge of the information or its source, the
expert must have been convinced that the data was sufficiently
22. See supra note 16.
23. United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1975).
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reliable to have formed the basis of an opinion in her daily profes-
sional practice. Accordingly, the "reasonable reliance" standard
under Rule 703, which requires the information be "of the type"
reasonably relied upon in the field, must be interpreted to require
that the information not only be of the generic "kind" that is rea-
sonably relied upon (for example, a doctor making diagnoses based
upon statements from injured persons), but also be "acquired in a
manner" that is consistent with the profession's standards
(through the doctor's personal interviews of the injured persons,
for example, rather than through a paralegal's interview subse-
quently provided to the doctor).24
This "kind" versus "manner of acquisition" distinction has
been the underlying current of many decisions that have excluded
expert opinions based upon otherwise inadmissible evidence. In In
re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,5 for example,
Judge Weinstein found a hematologist's and a pathologist's expert
opinions to be inadequate to overcome a motion for summary judg-
ment because of the manner in which the experts acquired their
data. After the action had been filed for the benefit of Vietnam
veterans, plaintiffs' counsel asked those veterans to fill out a
symptomology checklist and to indicate whether they had any of a
number of physical, mental, or emotional symptoms, as well as to
supply some general information about themselves and their chil-
dren. The judge, in effect, excluded the opinions because even
though this information is the "kind" that an examining physician
would require in rendering an opinion about patients' illnesses
(personal medical histories), that information normally would not
be obtained in that manner. In addition, a physician normally
would not rely upon this information without corroboration from
medical records, physical examinations, and medical tests. This
ruling reaffirmed the established Rule 703 principle that the "rea-
sonably relied upon" standard is one of practice, not trial
24. It goes without saying, of course, that the information upon which the expert
relied must have been relevant to the controversy before the court and consistent (or at
least not inconsistent) with the evidence upon which the finder of fact will be asked to
render a decision. For example, an expert will not be allowed either to offer an opinion
about the cause of a ship's sinking if that opinion is based upon factual assumptions that
are flatly inconsistent with the undisputed facts in the case, Cunningham v. Rendezvous,
Inc., 699 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1983), or to speculate about the economic effect of certain con-
duct when evidence in the record contradicts the basis of the testimony, Merit Motors, Inc.
v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1977).




Similarly, in In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liabil-
ity Litigation,27 the court struck the testimony of a plaintiff's doc-
tor because the doctor, in testifying to a causal link between a
swine flu vaccination and Guillain-Barre Syndrome, relied upon
data that the plaintiff's attorney collected from hospitals. The dis-
trict court held that "[tihe technique employed in compiling the
data is not of the caliber used in the field of epidemiology and
medical statistics and therefore, cannot form the basis of [the doc-
tor's] opinion testimony."2"
If the judge properly screens expert opinions to ensure compli-
ance with Rule 703's expanded basis requirements, no justification
exists for precluding the finder of fact from hearing and using
those facts supporting an opinion to the same extent as the expert.
Indeed, the present physical condition hearsay exception under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, from which the practice of differentiat-
ing between opinions and their bases appears to have been bor-
rowed, precisely follows this suggested approach.2" On the belief
that doctors can detect if patients are fabricating their statements,
Rule 803(4) now permits a doctor to repeat, for the truth of the
matter asserted, what a patient said to him about medical history
and cause, if those statements were "reasonably pertinent to diag-
nosis or treatment."30
26. See FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283 (1973) (bring-
ing Rule 703 practice into line with expert's own practice when not in court); see also Mc-
Lellan v. Morrison, 434 A.2d 28, 30 (Me. 1981) (finding that a physician's conferring with
another medical expert was common practice in forming opinions in that particular field).
27. 508 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981).
28. Id. at 904.
29. Rule 803(4) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(4) Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pains, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment.
FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
30. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Ill. 2d 590, 602-03, 119 N.E.2d 224,
231 (1954) (admitting injured person's statements to his treating physician about cause
under a hearsay exception because of the presumed trustworthiness of a statement relayed
in expectation of medical treatment). Further, what is significant about this expansion of
the present physical condition exception is that the patient no longer needs to have con-
sulted the physician solely for the purpose of treatment. Now the patient can consult solely
for the purpose of developing a diagnosis for trial use. Despite this elimination of a major
guarantee of trustworthiness-the patient's desire for accurate treatment-the Federal
590 [Vol. 40:583
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Professor Carlson is concerned about the "wholesale introduc-
tion" of data through experts."1 I share that concern to the extent
that courts may permit experts to dump large quantities of
unscreened evidence into the record. We should not resolve this
concern, however, by arbitrarily excluding an entire body of evi-
dence that the finder of fact should consider. If courts properly
scrutinize expert testimony to ensure that each expert has used her
special talents in screening the facts upon which she has relied, we
avoid the problem. Until the Federal Rules of Evidence incorpo-
rate a new hearsay exception to accommodate specifically the new
dimensions of the proposed practice under Rule 703, courts could
admit this hearsay under the residual exceptions codified in Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5). 2
Rules abandoned the common-law restriction because of the doctor's expertise in evaluating
the reliability of hearsay evidence.
31. Carlson, supra note 3, at 592.
32. Rule 803(24) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(24) A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
FED. R EvID. 803(24).
Rule 804(b)(5) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness:
(5) A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5).
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C. A Potential Problem
If the basis of an expert's opinion is admissible to the same
extent as the opinion that it supports, a party possibly could pre-
sent his entire case through an expert's testimony.3 This option
would present the theoretical possibility of the finder of fact's
resolving factual disputes based only on the testimony of biased
experts who have pretried the case through their evaluation of the
relevant facts. How realistic is this possibility? Although remote
when adequate facts exist to support the expert's conclusions
(because an advocate's case is always more convincing with the un-
derlying evidence), the possibility is much greater in marginal
cases when the party might attempt to mask the inadequacy or
nonexistence of evidence through the use of biased testimony of
his experts.3 4 For practical purposes, however, the probability that
a party would employ such a tactic is remote. In any event, de-
pending on one's view of the purpose of Rule 703, the problem is
either avoidable or, at least, manageable.
The most obvious solution to this potential problem is to limit
the applicability of the proposed hearsay exception to those
instances when the source of the expert's information is unavaila-
ble. This limitation could be accomplished simply by classifying
the exception under Rule 804, which makes the declarant's un-
availability material to his hearsay statement's admissibility. All
exceptions under this rule require a demonstrated necessity for
their use. Employing the residual exception presently recognized in
Rule 804(b)(5) should achieve this result because subsection (B) of
that rule requires that the hearsay evidence being offered be "more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evi-
dence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts. '35
If one views Rule 703's purpose as relieving parties of the
33. Rule 704 increases this possibility by permitting experts to give opinions on ulti-
mate issues in the case. It provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objection-
able because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
FED. R. EVID. 704.
34. A necessary product of Rule 703, therefore, is the need for trial judges to screen
the expert's testimony with care to ensure that a basis in fact exists and that the expert's
biases do not render her testimony inadmissible under Rule 403. See, e.g., Viterbo v. Dow
Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420, 1425-26 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (concluding that the expert did not
view the plaintiff's condition objectively because he sought employment from the plaintiff's
attorney in the subject case).
35. See supra note 31.
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cumbersome and time-consuming burden of establishing the basis
of expert opinions (because the expert's professional assessment of
that basis adequately assures its reliability), then the Rule 804
solution could be seen as inconsistent with that purpose. That is, a
required demonstration of unavailability under Rule 804 usually
would necessitate bringing forward the basis that Rule 703 no
longer requires. Thus, under this view of Rule 703, the only way to
avoid this extended use of experts is to require that a party estab-
lish a prima facie case independent of the expert's secondhand fac-
tual information. This approach would be untenable, however, be-
cause it would create an inferior class of substantive evidence given
by experts. Such evidence would be admissible for its truth, but
inherently insufficient to support a verdict. Likewise, such evi-
dence would be sufficient to form the basis of opinions, but insuffi-
cient to support a verdict consistent with those opinions. In effect,
this approach would perpetuate through the back door the same
illogic that is addressed through the front door by the admission of
the opinion's basis for its truth.
If we wish to give experts the right to rely on otherwise inad-
missible evidence and do not wish to impose a demonstrated neces-
sity requirement before they are permitted to offer that basis, the
risk of adversarial manipulation may be unavoidable. Such a risk,
however, is quite manageable for several reasons. First, as men-
tioned above, the probability of a party's employing such a tactic is
remote. Second, if a party attempts to establish his factual case
exclusively through an expert's testimony when independent evi-
dence in fact is available, the judge or jurors naturally will become
suspicious and, thus, view the expert's testimony with greater cau-
tion. Third, a party's failure to produce available evidence is the
fair subject of comment by the opposition in its closing argument.
Fourth, and most important, the expert's availability for cross-ex-
amination about her biases and the basis of her opinion should ap-
prise the jury sufficiently of the unreliability of that basis.
The accommodation of this potential misuse of expert testi-
mony is in substance similar to the situation in which a cause of
action's single disputed element is proven through hearsay
presented under an established exception. In the latter case the
entire case's disposition turns on this hearsay evidence. The most
significant difference in the hearsay establishing the basis of an ex-
pert's opinion is that its value can be more fully explored and,
therefore, more realistically weighed by the jury, because the ex-




IV. THE CONFRONTATION ISSUE
Professor Carlson confidently asserts throughout his Essay
that if the court permits a government expert in a criminal prose-
cution to recite the inadmissible underlying facts upon which he
relied (to prove their truth), a violation of the defendant's right of
confrontation will occur. He claims that unless the government
establishes a foundation, that is, qualifies the evidence under an
exception to the hearsay rule, the facts are constitutionally inad-
missible. I disagree.
In Ohio v. Roberts6 the Supreme Court announced the
requirements that the sixth amendment right of confrontation
imposes on the government when it uses hearsay against a criminal
defendant. In Roberts the defendant was convicted of a forgery
and possession of a stolen credit card based on the prior recorded
testimony that an unavailable witness had given at the defendant's
preliminary hearing. In upholding the use of this hearsay, the
Court provided a helpful explanation of the specific requirements
that the government may have to satisfy if offering hearsay in a
criminal prosecution, when the declarant is not available for cross-
examination:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate
"indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness."'
There are two important points to be made about Roberts.
First, the permissible use of hearsay is not limited to statements
that fall within an established exception to the hearsay rule. If the
hearsay falls within such an exception, the requisite indicia of reli-
ability will be presumed. If, however, the hearsay does not fall
within an established hearsay exception, its use is still permissible
if the government can demonstrate a sufficient level of trustworthi-
ness. Second, the Court specifically noted that the rule of necessity
(demonstrated unavailability) is inapplicable when the "utility of
trial confrontation" is "remote."38
36. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
37. Id. at 66.
38. Id. at 65 n.7. In making this notation, the Court specifically referred to the type of
[Vol. 40:583
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Contrary to Professor Carlson's suggestion, one cannot predict
the constitutional invalidity of any particular hearsay evidence
outside of the context in which that evidence is used. Even though
the Constitution favors the accused's face-to-face confrontation of
the witnesses offered against him, the use of hearsay does not ipso
facto violate the confrontation clause. Therefore, introducing the
otherwise inadmissible basis of expert opinions is not necessarily
unconstitutional. A violation of the confrontation clause will occur
only (1) when the court finds that a particular hearsay declarant
should be brought forward if he is available, and the government
fails to demonstrate that it has made a good faith, but unsuccess-
ful, effort to do so; or (2) when despite an adequate demonstration
of unavailability, the particular statement does not bear sufficient
indicia of reliability. 9
V. CONCLUSION
As the role of experts in litigation expands, the question of the
evidentiary status of an expert opinion's basis becomes increas-
situation that had been before it in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). In Dutton the
defendant was convicted of murder primarily on the basis of one of his co-conspirator's
testimony. This testimony, however, was corroborated by a hearsay statement of another co-
conspirator who, in response to the question "How did you make out in court?" (he had
been arraigned on the murder charge) made the following statement to his celImate: "If it
hadn't been for the dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Id. at 77.
The Court concluded that the use of this statement did not violate the defendant's confron-
tation rights because the utility of trial confrontation would have been remote. The Court
based this conclusion on the following factors: (1) the hearsay statement was not an expres-
sion about a past fact; (2) the declarant was obviously in a position to have known whether
Evans was involved in the murder; (3) little chance of faulty recollection existed; (4) the
circumstances under which the statement was made indicated no reason for Evans' involve-
ment in the crime to be misrepresented; (5) the primary evidence against Evans came from
another co-conspirator's testimony; (6) that cross-examination of the declarant would have
enlightened the jury about the statement's accuracy was highly unlikely; and (7) the witness
who heard the statement uttered was fully cross-examined.
Subsequent to Roberts, the Court has held that the rule of necessity (and the required
demonstration of unavailability) does not apply when the government offers a co-conspira-
tor's statement against the accused. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1985). The
Court thought that the truth-seeking process would gain very little from a face-to-face con-
frontation between the accused and the alleged co-conspirator. This was a poorly reasoned
decision. See P. RICE, EVIDENCE' COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5.01, at
331-37 (1986). One should be wary of its precedential value.
39. For an example of when the Court might find the indicia of reliability lacking, see
Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986). Even though a co-conspirator's confession that impli-
cated Lee fell within the declarations against interest exception, the Court found that the
confession possessed insufficient indicia of reliability because it was made while the co-con-
spirator was in custody and therefore had a motivation to fabricate in order to curry favor
with the police. Id. at 2063-66.
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ingly important. This status has given rise to litigation not only
under Rule 703, but also under the public records exception to the
hearsay rule, Rule 803(8)(C), when expert opinions are in the form
of government agency investigative findings."' The charade that
opinions and their bases are severable should end. Under the com-
mon law, such severance was simply an illogical practice that had
no meaningful implications. With the formal recognition of the
expert's right to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, however,
the practice is altering the players' roles in litigation. If we are
comfortable both with the expert's assumption of the role of super-
factfinder and thirteenth juror and with the diminished role that
necessarily follows for the judge or jury, we openly should acknowl-
edge and embrace this expanded role. If we are not, we should give
up the severability fiction as a remnant of the past and establish a
hearsay exception for the introduction of the bases of experts'
opinions that sets forth meaningful standards for ensuring
reliability.
40. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1143-50
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that in examining a public report in the nature of an expert opin-
ion, the court must determine the relevancy of the report by considering such factors as the
agency's expertise, the factual basis of the report, and whether those facts are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field).
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